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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-2936 
___________ 
 
LAWSON SEAN ALEXANDER, 
   Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A075-462-825) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Walter A. Durling 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 23, 2011 
Before:  SLOVITER, SMITH AND GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: December 28, 2011 ) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Lawson Sean Alexander challenges the Board of Immigration Appeals’s (“BIA”) 
conclusion that he is ineligible for cancellation of removal because he has been convicted 
of an aggravated felony.  For the following reasons, we will deny his petition for review. 
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I. 
 Alexander, a citizen of Grenada, was admitted to the United States in 1996, and 
granted lawful permanent resident status in 2000.  In 2009, the government initiated 
removal proceedings against him based on a 2008 Pennsylvania conviction for delivering 
a controlled substance, marijuana, in violation of 35 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 780-
113(a)(30).  Alexander was charged with being removable on the basis that the crime of 
conviction is both an aggravated felony, see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), and a 
controlled substance violation, see § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).  He conceded the latter charge but 
denied that he was removable as an aggravated felon.  After a hearing, the Immigration 
Judge (“IJ”) concluded that the 2008 conviction constituted an aggravated felony based 
on allegations in the probable cause affidavit, which reflected that Alexander sold a 
pound of marijuana to an undercover officer for $900.  Accordingly, the IJ found him 
ineligible for cancellation of removal and ordered him removed to Grenada. 
 The BIA concluded that the IJ appropriately considered the affidavit of probable 
cause because it was incorporated into the plea agreement, and agreed that the 2008 
conviction constituted an aggravated felony rendering Alexander ineligible for 
cancellation of removal.
1
  Alexander filed a timely petition for review.   
                                              
1
 The BIA also rejected Alexander’s request for a remand so that he could locate and 
present additional portions of his record of conviction.  Alexander does not challenge that 
ruling. 
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II. 
 The only issue raised by Alexander’s petition is whether the BIA erred in 
concluding that his 2008 conviction constitutes an aggravated felony.  We have 
jurisdiction to address that matter, as it presents a question of law.
2
  See 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(a)(2)(D); Jarbough v. Att’y Gen., 483 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir. 2007) (whether a 
conviction constitutes an aggravated felony raises a “purely legal question” falling within 
this Court’s limited jurisdiction). 
 Under the “illicit trafficking” approach, a state conviction constitutes an 
aggravated felony if the crime is a felony under state law and includes a “trafficking” 
element.  Jeune v. Att’y Gen., 476 F.3d 199, 201 (3d Cir. 2007).  An offense of 
conviction includes a trafficking element if it “involve[d] the unlawful trading or dealing 
of a controlled substance.”  Garcia v. Att’y Gen., 462 F.3d 287, 293 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(quotations omitted).  In other words, the offense must have involved the marketing of 
drugs.  See Steele v. Blackman, 236 F.3d 130, 135 (3d Cir. 2001).  As convictions under 
35 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 780-113(a)(30) do not invariably qualify as aggravated felonies, 
the Court must resort to the modified categorical approach, which looks to the facts 
necessarily admitted to determine whether a given conviction qualifies as an aggravated 
felony.  See Garcia, 462 F.3d at 293.  In the guilty plea context, application of the 
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 The government initially moved to dismiss Alexander’s petition for lack of jurisdiction, 
but now recognizes that we retain jurisdiction to address the aggravated felony issue.  
Accordingly, we will deny the government’s motion.     
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modified categorical approach permits consideration of the “statutory definition, charging 
document, written plea agreement, transcript of the plea colloquy, and any explicit factual 
finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assented.”  Evanson v. Att’y Gen., 550 
F.3d 284, 291 (3d Cir. 2008) (quotations omitted).     
 Here, the record of conviction before the IJ consisted of (1) the criminal 
complaint, which incorporated the affidavit of probable cause; (2) the criminal 
information; (3) the plea agreement signed by Alexander; (4) a document indicating when 
Alexander was arraigned and re-arraigned; and (5) an order imposing Alexander’s 
sentence.  Alexander’s plea agreement establishes that he pled guilty to “deliver[ing] a 
Schedule I controlled substance, to wit: MARIJUANA” in violation of 35 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. § 780-113(a)(30), a felony under state law, as charged in count one of the 
information.  (R. 129.)  Alexander is correct that the criminal complaint and attached 
affidavit of probable cause normally would not be appropriate sources to consider under 
the modified categorical approach because they were superseded by the information.  See 
Evanson, 550 F.3d at 293 n.7.  However, his signed plea agreement explicitly 
incorporated the allegations of the affidavit of probable cause – i.e., that he sold a pound 
of marijuana to an undercover officer for $900 – as the factual basis for his plea.3  
                                              
3
 Alexander argues that the BIA erred in relying on the plea agreement’s reference to the 
affidavit of probable cause because the statement was hand-written instead of typed.  Yet 
he acknowledged before the IJ that the plea agreement, which bears his signature, was 
part of his record of conviction.  (R. 87.)  Furthermore, there is simply no evidence that 
the document was altered.  Nor is there any basis for Alexander’s apparent belief that the 
affidavit of probable cause was fabricated. 
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Accordingly, it was appropriate for the BIA to consider the affidavit of probable cause 
because Alexander admitted the factual allegations therein.
4
  See Shepard v. United 
States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005) (in determining whether an element in question is 
necessarily admitted by a guilty plea, a court may consider “the terms of a plea agreement 
or transcript of colloquy between judge and defendant in which the factual basis for the 
plea was confirmed by the defendant”); Thomas v. Att’y Gen., 625 F.3d 134, 145-47 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (indicating that an officer’s allegations may be considered if “[t]he factual 
basis for [the] plea . . . [was] placed on the record by incorporating the written statement 
of the police officer”).  Based on those facts, Alexander’s 2008 conviction constitutes an 
aggravated felony because it contains a trafficking element. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny Alexander’s petition for review. 
                                              
4
 Alexander’s testimony before the IJ is not a source of information that may be 
considered under the modified categorical approach.  See Catwell v. Att’y Gen., 623 F.3d 
199, 210 (3d Cir. 2010).  Furthermore, we may not consider the transcript of the 
sentencing hearing that Alexander attached to his brief.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A).   
